SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : ADP Requirements and Projections

1. Reference is made to your verbal request for ideas and suggestions for projecting the use of ADP beyond present facilities in the Office of Security.

2. The attachment contains suggested ADP requirements, ideas, and projections from the various components of this Office, some of which may not be feasible at this time, but may have merit over the long run.

3. This Office has the following plans for the immediate future:

a. Implement the Security Automated Name Check Activity (SANCA), July-December 1966.

b. Plan and implement random access searches via remote inquiry stations (target date 1968).

c. Plan and implement a retrieval system for the Security Research Staff, working off of SANCA, once SANCA is operational.

d. Plan and implement a retrieval system for the new Industrial Security Division working off of SANCA.

25X1

4. If we can be of further service, please advise.

25X1

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

25X1

Att

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Adse
1 - Subj file
1 - Chrono

SECRET

I. EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

1. In the field of administration and training, the following are some suggested automatic data processing requirements:

    a. Qualifications register of Security Career Service personnel for use by the Career Service Board and its supporting committees.

    b. Central listing of personnel on standby travel status including name; date of most recent medical qualification; passport number, type, and date of issue; and date of issue and number of any ID cards which have been issued.

    c. Listing of contract employees, confidential correspondents, and contract stenographers.

    d. Six month report of personnel gains and losses by position title and grade to be used in preparing personnel projections.

    e. Area assignment preference report to indicate individuals who have requested specific overseas and domestic assignments.

    f. Quarterly report of Security Career Service personnel serving with other components of the Agency which would include projected rotation dates and replacements.

2. A great deal of information in the areas of personnel and training is now being recorded and made available in the form of periodic machine listings. However, it is sometimes very time consuming to obtain required information from the listings. For instance, an alphabetical listing of all Security Careerists is prepared on a periodic basis indicating the training courses taken by each individual. If it becomes necessary to determine which individuals have taken a specific course, the entire listing must be reviewed.

3. It would, therefore, be most useful if an automatic data processing capability could be developed which would respond rapidly to day-to-day requirements for information which has already been recorded.

4. An ADP system could be developed which, from an overall DDS point of view, would provide the above service to all DDS components - Logistics, Personnel, Communications, Security and Training.

5. The Security Committee, USIB, under the Chairmanship of the Director of Security, has accumulated records over the years which could be automated. These records also include unauthorized disclosures which, if automated, would provide a basis for the study of patterns and trends in this area.

2

SECRET

III. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

1. From an OS viewpoint, the industrial security area is wide open for applications in the computer field. The operating offices (DD/S&T, Logistics, etc.) will be feeding in information involving contractual relationships. It is anticipated that eventually the computer will be interrogated directly from inquiry stations with instantaneous read-out of desired information. This capability is needed to fulfill the responsibility for maintaining a current status for the DDS for all Agency contracting with non-governmental organizations providing a product or a service related to a product.

2. In the case of the individual contractor, examples of information to be retrieved would include but not be limited to the following:

   a. Number of contracts with the Agency
   b. Cost of Contract
   c. Sterility of Contract
   d. Classification of Contract
   e. Status of Contract (Degree of completion)
   f. Security Cost of Contract
   g. Security Inspection Requirements
   h. Security Inspection Schedule
   i. Employees of the contractor who have agency clearances to show:

      (1) Name
      (2) Date of Clearance
      (3) Type
      (4) Date of Birth
      (5) Security Violations

3. From the long range, it is anticipated there may be a tie-in with Headquarters from plants where there are major CIA contracts and security officers. Certain controls could be exercised on contractor personnel that have access to extremely sensitive CIA information particularly in their travel overseas and to Communist bloc countries.

SECRET

IV. INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

1. Projected computer operations in this area not only involve Headquarters but field activities as well and could be extended overseas where security officers are assigned. The field activities will require data transmission facilities and related equipment.

2. In Headquarters the following applications lend themselves to computer utilization:

   a. Covert Case Processing - Control of the progress of cases from time of receipt to time of closing. From this application, case statistics can be generated not only for the customer but for other planning purposes.

   b. Instant File Summaries - This application would benefit all components of Security. OS officials would be in the position to interrogate the computer from inquiry stations and obtain a summary without pulling a file. Instantaneous decisions can be made without delay.

   c. Scheduling and the Assignment of Field Cases - A study of this activity would disclose certain investigative patterns, which on the interrogation of the computer, could lay out an itinerary for the investigator at a saving and time to the government. At the same time, a determination could be made as to the agent the case should be assigned because of instantaneous reply on the caseload of each agent.

   d. Indices Searches by Field Offices - The agent through the field office could interrogate the computer in Headquarters by remote links on names that have been developed through investigation. As a result, the agent would receive a summary on the name which would aid him in his investigation. At the same time, the name or names could be added to the computer memory.

SECRET

SECRET

e. Reports of Investigation - The establishment of a
standard format for investigation reports, favorable
or unfavorable, transmitted by the field offices would
hasten case processing and at the same time would be
an input to the preparation of instant file summary, all
of which could be assembled and produced by the computer.

f. Credentials and Cover - This system as envisioned
would provide the Cover Branch of OS with periodical
alphabetical runs of Office of Security personnel under
cover with a listing of all credentials issued to them.
In addition, special runs on individual covers and/or
credentials could be obtained on short notice. Also,
runs could be obtained by office of assignment.
Eventually, all Office of Security Career Service person-
nel would be included in this system. This would even
include those OS personnel who are serving overseas
under DDP Divisions and also personnel who are in a
completely open status, thereby establishing a positive
record on all personnel.

25X1

        With the input of the proper information, machine
runs could be obtained in a variety of ways, for example,
total run by security case file numbers could be obtained
and runs could be obtained for the using component. One
of the obvious machine runs which OS could use would be

2

SECRET

a run for the field offices which could be sent to them
for purpose of comparison rather than, as is the case
now, requiring the field office to make up an accounting
and having it reconciled at Headquarters. However, by
remote links, the field office could interrogate the computer.

The present practice is to send out letters to users
requesting information as to whether or not a facility should
be cancelled or maintained. The computer could prepare
these letters and send them out automatically.

V. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND PERSONNEL SECURITY

1. Practically all components of the Office of Security are interested in the various aspects of counterintelligence. Much time and effort could be saved manually if such information was readily available. For example, with appropriate input, an ADP search could ascertain those employees, past and present, applicants, and persons of security interest who have worked for a particular firm, studied at a particular educational institution, visited or resided in a certain area, etc. This could be secured for desired time periods, geographical locations, and other specific requirements.

2. Similarly, membership in certain organizations by such persons again equated with time and location could be assembled and afforded preliminary analysis by ADP. An extension of this to include personnel assignments and training by Agency personnel, for example, could provide identification of personnel attending various training courses or having the same specific geographic assignment as an individual under security-counterintelligence study. With proper input of operational data, agents, etc., it might conceivably be possible to determine agents, operations, drops, caches, etc., to which an employee under security-counterintelligence study was exposed, if not indeed knowledgeable.

3. Numerous inquiries often arise on Agency problem cases which cannot be handled except through reviewing old problem reports manually and talking with individuals familiar with these cases. To retrieve information from the computer on such inquiries as to how many suicides have there been in the Agency; how many employees have travelled to the USSR, served in Iron Curtain countries, been recruited at a particular college, possibly from a lead source; and other related matters would expedite answers to top management.

4. Other computer applications may well involve all 701 cases, disgruntled employees, certain patterns concerning "unknown" subjects including obscene calls to female employees and calls to senior Agency officials, "damage assessments" on individuals leaving the Agency, and all employees who have had press contacts. The latter application would be directed primarily to leaks to news media. Eventually, it is conceivable that assessment or studies on all employees would be made without reference to files.

SECRET

VI. PHYSICAL SECURITY

1. Photographic Storage

a. One use of photographic storage would be the storage on magnetic tape of video signals of the photographs of Agency employees, agents, etc. Video-interrogators could thus re-produce, on command, the photo of any such person desired by a using officer. The most basic utilization would be in visitor control. A guard, for example, could have a video interrogator at his control point, the video screen facing him, the inquiry keys facing the visitor. The visitor could punch out his "secret" number without it being noted by the guard. The storage tapes would be interrogated, much as airline reservation records are interrogated for space availability in commercial practice, and the photographic image of the person holding that number shown on the screen for a visual comparison by the guard with the visitor before him.

b. Similarly, in overseas areas, a walk-in at a station who claimed to be an employee of another station or Headqu rters could be compared through a system interrogation. Of course, the true name or pseudonym could also be used to interrogate the system, but a numerical sequence would provide gre ter accuracy and provide for secure integration of agent photographs, making it unnecessary for the guard or inquiring station to learn the true identity or cryptonym.

In time of national emergency, with Agency staff, contract and agent personnel "walking-in" at an Agency facility closest to them at the time of the emergency, a visual comparison of the individual with an image obtained from photographic storage would be a most valuable method of determining identity. (The stored image could also provide a short text, if desired, relating further identification data, clearances, etc.)

SECRET

SECRET

c. This system could also be utilized for storage of photographs of hostile personalities, targets, etc., so that interrogation by name--or even description if properly imputed, would provide out-stations with a method of immediate interrogation of photographic holdings. In the event of description-only interrogation, the video read-out could provide a series of photographs one after the other, for the review of the person making the interrogation of the system. Thus, for example, if the system is interrogated with the physical-description-only of a suspected hostile agent, depending on the details available for such system interrogation, the person making the interrogation of the Headquarters holdings could review a series of photographs of hostile agents to determine the specific identity of the individual with whom he is concerned.

2. For the building security program there is a need for four services which can be satisfied by the receipt of periodic machine record runs, the frequency depending on the individual list:

a. A machine list of all Agency identification held by an individual, whether in true name or in pseudo. This would include the Agency badge, firearms permit, credentials, special passes, and related items.

b. List of random selections of safe combinations.

c. An alphabetized list of all char force personnel who are not cleared for non-escorted access to Agency installations to show current status of clearance and the areas in which an individual can work (needed every 3 - 4 days).

d. Alphabetized list of all custodians of all alarmed secure or vault areas in the Washington area.

3. There is a great need for the Safety Staff to be able to retrieve from combined Medical, Personnel and Security records information relating to injuries to include:

a. Date and time of injury.
b. Cause of injury

SECRET

    c. Severity of injury
    d. Name of injured
    e. Office designation of injured
    f. Cost of injury (Direct & Indirect)
    g. Place and location of injury
    h. Time lost due to injury
    i. Classification of injury (Based on ASA)

From a Headquarters beginning, this program could be extended to cover overseas bases and stations so a complete Agency report could be furnished to top management.

3

SECRET

VII. TECHNICAL SECURITY

1. There are two areas of interest: monthly statistical and individual station reports.

2. The monthly statistical report would retrieve such information as number of rooms examined in a stated period, miles traveled, bases and stations visited, telephones examined, etc.

3. The individual station report would provide a basis for analyzing a station, commo area, or safe house over a 5 - 10 year period re number of "finds", suspicious incidents, frequency of checks, and related information and it is anticipated that this analysis would be accomplished by the computer.